The State of Israel and the Hamas organization did not choose to find themselves side-by-side. Therefore the choice will be between stability underpinned by a balance of terror, or a violent struggle alleviated by periodic cease-fires. In this article, I will try to demonstrate the economic and political calculations that ought to lead the parties to prefer the relative stability of a balance of terror, since the alternative is a catastrophe for both sides.
Hamas achieved power somewhat ahead of its schedule, but it has already chosen the option of a cease-fire with Israel, and, so far as is known, it wants to maintain it for a fairly extended period. The considerations that brought Hamas to agree to a cease-fire are as follows: as the party in power, Hamas is committed to providing its nation with health, education, and welfare services, and to reduce corruption. These goals require a fairly calm security situation and financial resources. The Palestinian Authority’s (PA) tax revenues total $100 million a month, of which $60 million are tax transfers from Israel, and $40 million are collected domestically. There is also a $35 million stipend from the Gulf emirates. The PA suffers from a monthly budget deficit of $30-40 million.
In addition to its current budget, the PA directly or indirectly receives a fairly large amount of development and humanitarian aid from the UN, EU, and US. Hamas knows that agreeing to limited Iranian aid (and there is no chance of long-term stable aid from Iran) will cost it the other aid, and cause a catastrophic socio-economic meltdown. Hamas is well aware of the Palestinians’ total dependence on Israel for electricity, water, medicine, goods, transfers, and so on. A complete disengagement from Israel is simply not realistic.
Hamas wants to establish a national unity government. Anyway, it needs the explicit consent of Fatah and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu-Mazen) concerning past PA agreements, including the recognition of Israel on the part of the Hamas government (not the Hamas organization).
Hamas rose to power in democratic elections sponsored by the Quartet (the US, EU, UN, and Russia), and will probably not lose power by returning to total terrorism. These circumstances lead to Hamas’s consent for a cease-fire and meeting EU and UN guidelines.
The following objective conditions on the ground also lead Israel to come to terms with a Hamas-Fatah coalition with Abu-Mazen as president: 18 months ago, Israel already decided on a cease-fire with Hamas, to carry out the disengagement from Gaza, and conceded its ultimate demand in advance - disarming all the organizations. The considerations behind those decisions then are still valid today, and are even stronger.
The total collapse of the Palestinian Authority because of the cessation of all aid and tax transfers will freeze all health, education and welfare services, and place full responsibility for the West Bank (and possibly Gaza, too) on Israel. Do we want to restore military administration in the territories? I doubt it.
During the disengagement, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon avoided all meaningful political contact with the PA and Abu-Mazen. He decided that it was better for Israel to unilaterally establish the country’s borders, rather than being sucked into a debate with the Palestinians over the 1967 lines. This policy greatly weakened Abu-Mazen, and it could be pursued, possibly with even greater ease, in the Hamas-Fatah era.
The price of a general confrontation with Hamas is known to all; a return to the era of terrorism, which will take a very heavy economic toll, including a financial crisis of the kind Israel experienced in 2001-03. Israel should avoid deliberately choosing to return this period.
It is doubtful if Israel can effectively pressure a Hamas-Fatah coalition. The UN, Russia and the EU will support a Hamas-Fatah coalition that recognizes past agreements. Tactical pressure on Hamas, at least until Israel’s elections on March 28, is desirable for both Hamas-Fatah coalition considerations, and for domestic Israeli electoral considerations. After Israel’s elections, we should revert to operating on the basis of the objective situation.
In conclusion, in 2000, Israel gave then-PA chairman Yasser Arafat an ultimatum: accept the US-Israel’s diktat, or return to war. Arafat and his aides asked to postpone the Camp David talks. Israel refused, and the consequences were devastating for both sides.
Many people are now proposing to intensify pressure on Hamas and the PA, up to the point of liquidating Hamas. The likely result would be an total military escalation or the collapse of the PA, and Israel taking over responsibility in the territories.
In my opinion, objective reality should lead Israel to chose otherwise, to strive to stabilize the situation, agree to the establishment of a Hamas-Fatah coalition that recognizes previous agreements, and to try to reach a fairly extended and institutionalized cease-fire that will provide a time-out for reviewing future options for an agreement, or at least a cease-fire underpinned by a balance of terror.
Political and security stability for several years is essential for both sides. It will lead to either mutual recognition, or to a further military escalation at the end of the process. It should be remembered that, in any case, a Hamas-led PA cannot survive without electricity, borders, water, and Israeli tax transfers, so it constitutes no real strategic threat, but only a declarative one, during the election campaign.
The author has participated in official and unofficial talks with the Palestinians and Jordan since 1993.
Published by Globes [online], Israel business news - www.globes.co.il - on March 13, 2006
© Copyright of Globes Publisher Itonut (1983) Ltd. 2006