The Winograd committee has published its interim report, after delivering copies to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Minister of Defense Amir Peretz at 4 pm today. According to Channel 10, “The report is harsher than what the leaks to the media claim.”
The Winograd committee found “ministerial and personal responsibility by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert,” and that “the IDF chief of staff failed by not being prepared for a war in the north.”
Channel 10 added that Peretz did not wait for the report, and that his aides prepared 20 media messages in advance.
Olmert’s aides predict that there will be no “earthquake” from the report, adding that a newspaper article or street demonstration does not bring down a government.
After reading the reports conclusions, Olmert will decide whether to respond. If he does so, he will probably admit, “We made mistakes.” However, it is unclear whether he will own up to his personal responsibility and say that he was responsible for these mistakes. His aides stress that he has no intention of resigning in any event.
“As for the minister of defense: He is the minister responsible for the IDF, and the senior member in the group of leaders for diplomatic and security affairs. He had no knowledge or experience in diplomatic, security or state affairs. Nevertheless, he took decisions during the period under review without organized consulting with professional persons, including people from outside the defense establishment.
"We find that the government's decisions and way they were made were severely defective. We place the main responsibility for these deficiencies on the prime minister, the minister of defense, and the chief of staff. The three of them each made a decisive personal contribution to these decisions and to the way they were arrived at. Nevertheless, the responsibility for these failures is shared by many others."
On the decision to mount an immediate, strong military response to the capture of two soldiers, Winograd finds, "This decision was not based on a detailed plan… the ability to achieve a military objective having a political effect was limited, and there was no military answer to the Katyusha rocket fire without an effective, prolonged campaign which would have exacted a high cost and for which support was low. These difficulties were not raised before the political decision makers. There was weakness in the strategic thinking.
"The government's support was obtained, among other things, on the basis of a vague presentation of objectives and modes of operation, and these things enabled ministers, who had differing and opposing approaches, to support the move. Government ministers voted in favor of a decision the nature and consequences of which they did not know and understand. They decided to embark on a campaign without thinking how to emerge from it. Some of the declared objectives of the operation were not made clear and were not achievable.
"The army did not display creativity in proposing alternatives, did not warn of the discrepancy between the scenarios of how the campaign would develop and the modes of operation that were approved, did not demand a call-up of the reserves, which would have made it possible to equip and train them for a land campaign, if required. Even after these facts became clear to the politicians, they did not suit the military operation to its objectives and the characteristics of the theater of war. On the contrary: the objectives presented to them were over- ambitious.
"As far as the prime minister is concerned, he bears supreme and general responsibility for the decisions taken by his government and for the army's operations. The responsibility for the decision to go to war derives both from his position and from his conduct of affairs, since he took the initiative. The prime minister made up his mind without second thoughts, without a detailed military plan being presented to him, and without demanding that such a plan should be presented, and without giving consideration to the Lebanon theater and the military and diplomatic alternatives available to Israel.
"The prime minister acted without any proper consultation with others, especially outside of the army, despite his lack of experience. The prime minister is responsible for the aims of the campaign not being clearly and carefully defined, and for the fact that the relationship between the aims of the campaign and the means of achieving them was not properly set out.
"The prime minister bears personal responsibility for the fact that the declared objectives were ambitious and were unattainable. The prime minister did not amend his plan after it became clear that the plans were impracticable and were not being realized. All these things add up to severe failure to exercise judgment, responsibility, and caution.
“The minister of defense did not operate using the strategic perspective of the establishment that he supervised. He did not ask for and did not examine the IDF’s plans. He did not verify the IDF’s readiness, did not determine the correlation between the actions proposed and compared and the goals that were presented. His influence on the decisions mostly related to minutiae, and he did not present or ask for alternatives.
“The minister of defense’s inexperience and lack of knowledge prevented him from authoritatively challenging the IDF, which he supervised, or the prime minister. It can be said that his service and functioning as minister of defense during wartime weakened the government’s ability to deal with the challenges.
“As for the chief of staff: He is the supreme commander of the IDF and the main source of information about the IDF, its plans, capabilities, and recommendations to the political echelon. His personal involvement in decisions within the IDF, and in coordination with the political echelon, was dominant. He was not prepared for the expected incident when the kidnapping occurred, and he acted impulsively.
“The former chief of staff did not present to the political echelon the IDF’s dismal situation, the IDF’s plans, or a theater analysis. The responsibility of the former chief of staff is even greater, in view of the fact that both the prime minister and minister of defense lack experience, and the fact that the impression was created for them that all was well. In all of these matters, the former chief of staff failed in fulfilling his duties, demonstrated a lack of professionalism, responsibility, and deliberation.”
The Winograd committee nevertheless found that many other persons share in these failures during the period under examination and the results of the war. However, the main responsibility falls on Olmert, former IDF chief of staff Lt.-Gen. (res.) Dan Halutz, and Peretz, in that order.
MK Ophir Pines-Paz (Labor) said, “The investigative committee should not fire the prime minister, but the prime minister and defense minister should resign today. If they do not resign tonight, I’ll call on the public to go onto the streets.”
MK Yoel Hasson (Kadima) said, “[Hizbullah chief] Nasrullah failed to win the war; don’t give him his victory now. The report ought to read professionally and shouldn’t be used as a guillotine. The prime minister should make the necessary changes in the cabinet.”
MK Yossi Beilin (Meretz) said, “The committee’s conclusions leave no room for interpretation. Amir Peretz should immediately withdraw his candidacy for chairmanship of the Labor Party and head of the government, and Olmert should not wait for demonstrations. His only contribution to the country should be to resign.”
Published by Globes [online], Israel business news - www.globes.co.il - on April 30, 2007
© Copyright of Globes Publisher Itonut (1983) Ltd. 2007