The recent escalation of tensions between Yemen and Saudi Arabia is
a cogent reminder of the compelling importance for Sa'ana of having
sound ties with Riyadh. This is necessary to help it attract foreign
investors in its ambitious hydrocarbon and port development programs.
The Yemeni-Saudi escalation, which follows by only several weeks the
completion of Yemen's recent parliamentary elections, revolves around
rival claims of sovereignty over disputed territory along the two
countries' common border. The fact that the Islamically-oriented Islah
party, a longtime Saudi ally, was soundly defeated in the Yemeni poll
may well have contributed to the development of the crisis.
Background to the Tensions
According to reports from Sa'ana, this latest installment in the
long running Saudi-Yemeni border dispute began in earnest earlier last
month when Yemeni Foreign Minister Abdelkarim Iryani was deliberately
snubbed by Saudi officials upon arrival in Riyadh to open talks
on the border issue. The Yemeni side claims that Mr. Iryani was made to
wait at the airport for more than three hours before being
unceremoniously informed that rather than meeting with either King Fahd,
Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal or Crown Prince Abdullah, he was being
fobbed off on a relatively junior official. This, say the Yemenis, was
an unforgivable insult not so much to Mr. Iryani himself, but rather to
the entire Yemeni people as well as to their government.
Essentially, Mr. Iryani's visit to Riyadh was an attempt to
break the logjam in the continuing Saudi-Yemeni border imbroglio, which
has its origins in the 1930s. As recently as 1995 it led to a
series of bloody military confrontations between the two countries'
armed forces. Among the territories at issue are four separate
sub-districts in the Yemeni provinces of Saada and Hadramout.
Saudi claims of sovereignty have long been rejected by the Yemenis, most
recently in a controversial decision to re-organize them
administratively. This clearly stirred Saudi anger. As it
happens Yemeni officials have consistently rejected Saudi demands to
allow a referendum in the areas in question,
justifiably fearing that giving the residents the opportunity to
choose their country of affiliation would not necessarily work to Yemeni
advantage.
Another issue at stake in the Saudi-Yemeni dispute is a
long-standing Saudi bid to convince the Yemenis to cede to Riyadh a two
kilometer wide corridor crossing eastern Yemen and linking the border
area of al Wadia to Ras Ali on the Indian Ocean. The Saudis want this
territory because it would provide them with a way of exporting crude
from a planned super-tanker terminal on the Indian Ocean coast, and so
reduce their dependence on politically sensitive routes through either
the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab al Mandab Strait, or through the Suez
Canal.
What Comes Next
Yemeni anger, over what Sa'ana considers to be high handed
Saudi behavior in dealing with the border issue, is now intense. However, its
ability to indulge that anger is clearly restrained, most directly by
its compelling need to create the impression of having friendly ties
with Riyadh. This need is neatly underscored by Yemen's ambitious
hydrocarbon development program, as well as by its equally ambitious
plans to attract foreign investment to transform the port of Aden into a
major Persian Gulf transshipment point.
With all of this in mind, it is now likely that a new effort will
soon be launched to put a damper on the rising Saudi-Yemeni
tensions. One possible pointman between the two countries might
well be Abdullah al Ahmar, the speaker of the Yemeni parliament, whose
affiliation with the Islah party would make him particularly acceptable
to Saudi interests, without necessarily ruling him out in
Sa'ana.
Risk Report Quarterly.