"Ahead of the ground offensive, whenever it will be, it is important that the public will understand two things that go hand in hand but somewhat contradict each other," Maj. Gen. Yaakov Amidror (res.), former head of Israel's National Security Council (2011-13) and senior fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security tells "Globes."
"On the one hand, it is very important to understand that it is not possible to eliminate the military capability of the Hamas organization without a ground assault (into Gaza). It is impossible to do this with intelligence and countermeasures, or by continuing the siege or only by air force operations alone. We must bring in the ground forces.
"But in the same sentence it should be said that the ground entry is not simple at all. It will be a very difficult, very complex, very complicated operation. It is true that we are very strong, but fighting in a built-up area that has been prepared for defense is considered very difficult in the military world, especially for the attacking side.
"The side defending itself in the fighting has a great advantage, but we have no choice. We must bring in the ground forces in order to destroy the military capability of Hamas. There is no rush, we have time and we must do it sensibly. We must not enter hastily, because it is necessary to have thorough and rigorous plans. But we must do it. The public in Israel needs to understand both sides of this equation, one that it is necessary, and secondly that it will not be easy and we will have quite a few losses."
Amidror adds, "It will not be like previous incursions in previous operations in the Gaza Strip, it will be a much, much broader entry. I can say, without knowing the operational plan that the aims of the fighting this time - the destruction of Hamas' military capacity - is very far from what it was in the past, both in terms of the scale of the forces and also and the depth of entry."
What will be in the Gaza Strip afterwards? There are several options.
Asked what will be in the Gaza Strip after the victory over Hamas, Amidror says, "There are several options here, and it depends a lot on what happens in the fighting itself, after which we will have to make a decision. At one extreme, there is an option to stay there with a military government. At the other extreme, we could finish what we need to do in the Strip militarily, and then just leave, and the Strip will remain a problem for the world and for anyone who wants to deal with this problem - that is not our business.
"We have only one interest in the Gaza Strip, and that is not the well-being of the residents, but to fight any force that tries to establish a military capability in Gaza. We must continue to hurt anyone who tries to do that even after this war is over.
"Between option A and B, there are all kinds of intermediate possibilities that need to be considered. Which international authority might come in? Maybe the Palestinian Authority? Everything, as mentioned, will be determined according to the results of the fighting, according to what is seen on the ground, according to international public opinion, according to the talks that we will conduct in the Middle East and much more. There is no need to make the decision now."
Should the fact that there are 199 hostages influence the offensive, and how will it in practice influence it.
As long as we do not know the location of the hostages and captives, it should not affect our operational plan. We should do what is necessary and possible to identify their location, or at least the location of some of them, and then the operational judgment should be left to the political and military level on how to act to try to get them back. Because once you know where they are, that's another consideration."
Is it clear that there was a mistaken concept here, and if so, what did it stem from?
"We had a series of failures on the eve of this attack by Hamas. First of all, we had an intelligence failure - there was no warning. We had a failure in the concept of the essence of Hamas, and how far it is an organization that has interests other than terrorism, and we had a mistake in the defensive concept that was not adapted to the scenario that took place.
"We need to check all these things straight after the war. To waste time and energy on issues that do not lead us to an absolute victory in the war right now is a mistake. But straight after we win, after the war is over, we will have to look back. Not to look for people so that heads can roll, but to understand how did we made the mistake, in order to be better in the future."
"Iran is behind the strength of Hamas"
Is there in your opinion a grain of truth in the reasoning that Iran pushed Hamas to hit us just now to prevent us drawing closer to Saudi Arabia?
"I think there is more than a grain of truth in this, and that for the Iranians a Middle East where there is an American, Saudi and Israeli alliance is something they are very much afraid of, and they do not want the Middle East to look like this, but I know of no proof that Iran was behind the attack, in the sense of the timing and the scale of the attack.
"But it should be remembered that even if there is no such proof, the one who has invested a lot of money in Hamas and given it a lot of weapons, and trained Hamas people and taught Hamas how to produce some of its own capabilities, is Iran. So even if Iran was not behind the attack in terms of timing and location, Iran still stands behind the strength of Hamas. Both in economic and military terms."
In wars you don't worry about the enemy's population"
During the fighting should Israel take into account the humanitarian angle?
"We must, as part of international law, subjugate all other interests to our main interest - to destroy the military capacity of Hamas. With all due respect to the world, the British did not ask themselves any humanitarian questions when they bombed Germany in WWII. Today they are giving weapons to the Ukrainians and they are not asking any humanitarian questions about the Russian cities that are being hit by the ammunition that the West gives them. When there is an enemy state on the other side, and Gaza is an enemy state as far as we are concerned, we behave as in war, and in war we do not worry about the needs of the enemy population. Don't abuse it, and try not to hurt it, but in the end the aim should be clear.
"You have to understand that Hamas operates behind the civilian population, and does everything to harm our citizens, so this is a very clear situation. You also have to remember that at the end of the day, the Palestinians chose Hamas in democratic elections. Therefore, it is impossible to make claims against Israel when it acts in accordance with its needs in the war. By the way, in all the previous operations we took seriously the claims of humanitarian needs of the residents of Gaza, and in the end you see where it got us."
What is the role of the Palestinian Authority in this whole story? Abu Mazen issued a condemnation of the atrocities in the south after a week and then deleted it, but what is their interest here?
"Abu Mazen and the Palestinian Authority have no role in this situation. As we said, there are those who think he will have a role at the end of the war. In the meantime, Abu Mazen is happy that the two sides are killing each other, because he hates both. He hates us and of course he hates Hamas."
Why is the US supporting us so much this time? Is it Biden's Zionism?
"This unprecedented support can be interpreted as something personal to Biden. But there is something more here, to make it clear to the world that the US-Israel-Saudi alliance is stronger and can be trusted more than the Iran-Hezbollah-Hamas-Islamic Jihad alliance. It is already something that concerns the status in the world not only of Israel, but also of the US."
Published by Globes, Israel business news - en.globes.co.il - on October 18, 2023.
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