Israelis have been arranging their lives around WhatsApp for some years. Only a small percentage of Israelis don’t use WhatsApp, according to data from the Israeli Internet Association. The problem is that the IDF has also made the Meta app an integral part of military routine.
In Israel 2025, you don't need advanced military systems to gather intelligence, you just need to be in the right WhatsApp group. The app that has become the nation’s favorite communications tool continues to penetrate deeply into the army, and two years after the start of the war, the situation is only getting worse: duty rosters, classified discussion times, recruitment dates and troop movements - everything flows with remarkable ease within huge groups, which frequently include members who have long since finished their service. The threat is clear: live and sensitive tactical information is available at the touch of a button - exactly what Israel's enemies are looking for.
Hundreds of members and constant information - unsupervised
At the start of the war, "Globes" repeatedly reported on how the war was also being conducted on WhatsApp. Many described how almost all the activities of the various units were carried out via the app, from recruiting and managing personnel to transferring details of schedules, routes, and even photographic documentation from the field. Initially there was total chaos, which was natural for the start of a surprising and fierce war, but two years have passed and nothing has changed.
Recently, "Globes" saw additional evidence that information that can create a complete intelligence picture is still being transmitted in various WhatsApp groups: dates of operation of teams and units, dates of recruitment, release and exchange of forces, deployments, detailed schedules of units, schedules of senior officers. Alongside this, work arrangements, orders and base locations are sent on the Waze navigation app.
From the evidence that has been brought to "Globes" attention, one thing is clear: Despite the sensitive information circulating in these WhatsApp groups, no one supervises their members. Sometimes, hundreds of the group members are no longer relevant. For example, those who stopped serving in the reserves but did not leave the groups, and despite being civilians, continue to receive classified and confidential information every day directly via WhatsApp.
The risks are clear: This is a completely civilian application, without any military contract with the IDF and without conditions or procedures that are defined. Moreover, cyberattacks are becoming more sophisticated, and more attackers are managing to gain control of WhatsApp accounts. The thought of an attacker from an enemy state taking over an Israeli soldier’s account and exposing classified information is particularly disturbing. In this sense, the information is literally being served to the state’s enemies on a silver platter.
"In the investigations conducted into the massacre at the Nahal Oz base on October 7, it was discovered that Hamas planned everything based on information it had stolen from photos on social media," says Dr. Nathaniel Palmer, a senior lecturer in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at Bar-Ilan University, who has studied the intelligence of terrorist organizations and authored a book about the intelligence war that Hamas is waging against Israel.
"There is a crazy gap between what we perceive as a secret and what interests an actor like Hamas," Dr. Palmer tells "Globes." "While we tried to keep the secret very tight on information, what interested them were precisely things that were on the edge of secret or not secret in our eyes. The activity at the reactor is not in their intelligence language discourse. On the other hand, the number of soldiers and the location of the jeep on the fence - the tactical things that are on the edge of secret, are given strong emphasis by them."
Although there is no official data or statistical picture, Palmer is certain of this: "The army is run on WhatsApp. The app is widely used because it is the most available and fastest way to pass on information. I don't believe the claim that classified information doesn't pass through these groups. To be able to say that you have to monitor all the relevant WhatsApp groups and there is no technology or manpower to do that."
"It is not known what helps the other side. The risk is too great"
One of the biggest problems in the information transfer chain is the users, says Palmer. "Most users don't know what the restrictions are. Maybe there are guys in headquarters who know how to decide what is classified and what is not, but the people in the field, living their daily routine don't know the difference. We don't understand what helps the other side, and the risk we run is too great. The intolerable ease with which things are conducted, such as entering groups without control, gives intelligence to the other side for free."
Einat Miron, a cyber risk expert and consultant to companies on the issue, explains to "Globes" that we are in the midst of the situarion. "The train has long left the station. This is not something that is being discovered now and can be quickly closed. The only thing that can be done right now is to stop everything, to make new lists of what can be conducted outside and what is not allowed. Technologically, it is impossible to control every discussion, but it is possible to map the things that are important for us to monitor, and to stop this content. For example, systems by keywords."
Miron identified another phenomenon that typified the WhatsApp problem - this time from the job market. "For several months now, I have been collecting screenshots of graduates of special intelligence units who upload posts to networks about job searches, and sometimes actually detail where they served, in what fields they specialize and in which teams they worked. And what do the Iranians actually want? To build an intelligence picture. In this way, they can map who was in which unit and what software they specialize in, target them with specific phishing, and through that move forward with other major steps."
While the IDF has yet to formulate procedures on the continued use of WhatsApp, it does seem to be beginning to understand that even unclassified information can do damage. During the war, there were several cases of soldiers being arrested in other countries after being identified through photos they uploaded to social media in uniform. This led the IDF to decide to prohibit soldiers from uploading photos with their faces uncovered while in uniform.
IDF tightens security, but a "cultural change" is needed
In recent weeks, various measures by the IDF to tighten information security have made headlines. It began with the decision not to allow Chinese-made cars into bases, continued with taking back Chinese-made Chery cars given to officers, and recently even implemented the Morpheus system - an AI-based system for monitoring public accounts of IDF soldiers on social media. The latest big headline on the subject is a report in Galei Tzahal (Army Radio) that the IDF is expected to publish an order that will prohibit officers from owning Android devices for military purposes.
Is this sufficient? According to Miron, "A good hacker knows how to distil the most trivial information. There is no way to prevent what is public and exposed but it can be delayed or made difficult. There are ways and there is the technology, and we have to decide which ones to use and enforce it. We are world champions in not enforcing policy or regulation. Instead of being populist and saying that we don't work with Chinese drones or Android, we need to adjust the procedures that were written in 2000."
Dr. Palmer agrees and says that the country needs to undergo a "cultural change." "We all share everything all day long. The change will only happen if there is a change in perception. When there is no legislation from above to stop it, it will only work from below."
The IDF spokesperson said, "The IDF conducts ongoing risk management, control, and monitoring of the use of unclassified communication on the WhatsApp app. The IDF stresses the responsibility of service members to adhere to the guidelines and safeguard classified information, both in command discipline and in conducting close monitoring of deviations from guidelines. The relevant echelons receive a military mobile device for operational use and undergo organized briefings by the division's information security officer."
Published by Globes, Israel business news - en.globes.co.il - on December 4, 2025.
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