While the north of Israel experienced the largest number of air-raid sirens last week since the start of the war (723), this still represents a weak effort in comparison with the fears that there were in Israel of a full-blown war with Hezbollah. The predictions of huge salvoes of precision missiles at the heart of Israel’s population centers have not materialized. Why is this, and did we overestimate the Lebanese terrorist organization?
"On the face of it, we would have expected a far heavier reaction after the detonation of the pagers and the assassinations of senior Hezbollah figures, including Nasrallah himself," says Hilla Haddad-Chmelnik, a space and aeronautical engineer who participated in the development of the Iron Dome air defense system and a former director-general of the Ministry of Innovation and Science, "and Hezbollah certainly had the capabilities, such as munitions and launchers."
So why aren’t we seeing these capabilities being used? "We’re seeing a phenomenon similar to what we have seen with Hamas," she says. "Their large rockets, like those of Hamas, require either placement and precise preparation in advance, or a complicated operation to make them ready for use in real time. At the beginning of the campaign, both of these capabilities were hit hard. The first was Hezbollah’s command and control. Almost all the commanders of the missile network have been killed or put out of action, and the senior command backbone that is meant to decide on raining a dramatic salvo of missiles on Tel Aviv no longer exists.
"So who is supposed to make the decision? There have been targeted assassinations in the past, but a critical mass has been created that has resulted in paralysis in the organization." Yesterday, for example, the IDF announced that alongside Nasrallah, Ali Naaf Ayoub, who was responsible for managing Hezbollah’s firepower, was also killed.
Colonel (res.) Talya Lankri, formerly head of the Home Front Division in the National Security Council and currently a member of the Gedera local council, also points out that besides the technical capability required to launch missiles, "There has to be someone to make the decision to carry out large salvoes of precision missiles. We may not have eliminated the technical capability, but they have no command and control. What they are firing now is relatively short range. Furthermore, they are concerned about the consequences. We see that Lebanon is not allowing Iranian aircraft to land at its airport. That’s what deterrence looks like."
Intelligence supremacy
Haddad-Chmelnik adds that one of the most outstanding things in the current campaign against Hezbollah is unprecedented intelligence supremacy. "Israel’s intelligence grip is wide, and what is easy to bring out and is already primed is attacked. The combination of that and the elimination of those responsible for preparing the missile array anew creates a paralysis in Hezbollah that doesn’t allow them to mount an appropriate response."
She compares the situation to Israel’s conduct in the Second Lebanon War. "There was harsh criticism of the shortcomings of the bank of targets, and now there are many more. The army understands what is happening on the other side. We saw how quickly the IDF came out with the announcement that Nasrallah had been killed. I don’t know the intelligence world in depth, but what is certain is that the IDF has intimate knowledge of what is happening on the other side." To that Lankri adds: "The IDF is now on the hunt. It’s enough that there’s a gathering to make some decision, and the building is taken down. It testifies to enormous command of intelligence."
In Haddad-Chmelnik’s view, the gap between this intelligence supremacy and the stinging intelligence failure a year ago stems from the fact that "this is the war that the Air Force and military intelligence and the whole of the IDF have prepared for for years, and the power of that is obvious. It stands out in relation to October 7, which we didn’t prepare for. We come to this battle in high readiness, with all the relevant tools. We didn’t prepare for a war of attrition such as there has been for the past year, but for an intensive war with Hezbollah, which is a military organization and not a guerilla group, we certainly did prepare. When the IDF prepares for wars, it’s the strongest army in the Middle East. Let’s hope it continues that way."
Hezbollah could yet recover
For all that, Haddad-Chmelnik hedges her optimism. "It has to be said in all humility that this could be temporary, and perhaps they will pull themselves together. The capabilities exist, from the point of view of the launchers and the weapons, and in my opinion the know-how too, and the leadership might recover and fill the vacuum, and there’ll be someone who will make the decisions and end the paralysis. But that gives us enough time to continue to attack and degrade these capabilities significantly. But it has to be understood that the capabilities still exist, and there could be a recovery. Perhaps a leadership will emerge from below."
In addition, says Haddad-Chmelnik, "It’s important not to become complacent, and we must also be careful about saying things like ‘they scared us over nothing,’ because the capabilities certainly existed. Before the blowing up of the pagers, it’s certainly conceivable that the Hezbollah’s response would have looked completely different. We shouldn’t beat ourselves up about that. On that day ten days ago they did something extraordinary and highly impressive: 1,500 operatives are reported to have been taken out of action in a singe moment. Think what would happen to us if all the combat colonels were disabled. It would have a big effect on the IDF’s ability to function."
"The discrepancy with what happened in the south is significant by an order of size," says Lankri. "It’s not just that we eliminated Nasrallah. It’s much more. It began on the day of the pagers, which put them in a spin. Victory depends on the ability to take the initiative, to surprise, and to disrupt, and that’s what we are now doing. The day of the pagers started a new war. The initiative was taken away from us on October 7, we got into a war of attrition, and this was part of the IDF’s answer to the question of how to take back the initiative."
Victory needs to be defined
What about a possible ground incursion into Lebanon to bring the war to an end? Before that, says Haddad-Chmelnik, "We have to define clear aims for the war, and not slogans like ‘absolute victory’. We have to ask: What’s the end picture that we aspire to? From that derives the answer to the question of whether a ground operation is necessary or not. At the moment, we are controlling the agenda of the war, and this is precisely the time to define the victory picture of the war in the north. Do we want Hezbollah’s Redwan force on the far side of the Litani River? What about the civilian population of South Lebanon? Do we want an unoccupied perimeter zone on the border? What do we want there to be at the end?"
Haddad-Chmelnik stresses that "As time goes by, the other side will regroup, the world will intervene, and the statistics will even out and there will be fewer successes and more casualties from rockets. We therefore have to be very clear about where we want to get to. So that we don’t find ourselves in the Lebanese mire come February."
Lankri sounds more determined about the need for a ground operation. "In the past year, the IDF has scored significant achievements, but in order to take away Hezbollah’s ability to be close to the border, we have to go in on the ground." She says that an opportunity should be give to diplomatic moves that will enable Hezbollah to be kept far away from the border, but "if we don’t manage to achieve that by diplomatic means, and there’s no settlement soon, there will be no choice but to go in with forces on the territory. There are things that can’t be achieved any other way."
Published by Globes, Israel business news - en.globes.co.il - on September 30, 2024.
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